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ABSTRACT 
We present and test the idea that bequest planning is linked with the experience of inheriting. 
We consider “a family tradition of bequeathing” as a channel through which the intention to 
bequeath is moulded by and is positively correlated with the experience of inheriting. Using 
data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), we find that the 
experience of inheriting enhances the intention to bequeath, independently of the positive 
impact of wealth. We also find that the expectation of inheriting has a positive impact on the 
intention to bequeath, controlling for the expected increase in wealth on account of future 
inheritances.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is keen interest in the dynamics of wealth distribution and the intergenerational 
transmission of income inequality and wealth dispersion. Because inheritances and bequests 
are at the heart of this dynamics, it is important to understand how they are linked. In this 
paper we study the manner in which bequests made by parents - which are the inheritances 
received by children - impact on the children’s inclination to bequeath. The idea that looking 
at three generations could yield novel insights into the relationship and interaction between 
two generations is not new to the present study (see, for example, Stark 1999; Cox and Stark 
2005b, 2007). Other things held the same, it is reasonable to expect that the receipt of an 
inheritance will create an environment that is conducive to making bequests, such that 
bequeathing will correlate positively with inheriting. However, the argument could also run in 
the opposite direction: people who did not receive an inheritance and who found it difficult to 
get on in life without the support provided by an inheritance will not want their children to be 
subjected to a similar experience, assuming, of course, that people are altruistic towards their 
children. In that case, bequeathing will correlate positively with the non-receipt of an 
inheritance. This inconclusive reasoning itself invites empirical study. 
 
 We hypothesize that there is a positive link between the intention to bequeath and the 
experience of inheriting. Knowing which mechanism underlies bequest behaviour is important 
(also) because causality matters when it comes to any social preferences for equality, 
widespread public concern about intergenerational transmission of wealth and equality of 
opportunity, and optimal taxation. If, for example, wealth as such determines the size of 
bequests, then a progressive wealth tax will “hurt” the intergenerational transmission of 
inequality. If wealth is not the determinant of bequests but family tradition, then bequests will 
be little elastic to the taxation of wealth. It is useful to unravel whether there is a family 
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tradition, because if there is, then we will have an explanation for observed variations in 
saving behaviour, especially among the elderly, as we could attribute such variations to 
heterogeneity in the desire to leave bequests. Moreover, when there is a strong family 
tradition of bequeathing, people may not only be impervious to changes (increases) in estate 
taxes but will also adjust their consumption to financial turbulence, such as a significant 
decline in share prices and stock market losses, by more (dip into savings by less) than if the 
family tradition effect were weak (namely, when there is little desire to uphold a family 
tradition to bequeath). 
 
 Following a brief review of related studies in Section I, the family tradition model is 
presented heuristically in Section II. (A formal depiction of the model is relegated to the 
Appendix.) Sections III and IV, respectively, describe the data, and outline the econometric 
procedure employed in the empirical inquiry. Our results are presented and discussed in 
Section V. In Section VI we discuss altruism and charitable bequests. Section VII concludes, 
and sketches out some reflections on follow-up research. In the Appendix we also present in 
brief a historical case study that lends support to our approach. 
 
We consider it important to note, and to do so right at the outset, that our empirical 
analysis draws on responses provided to questions about intentions to bequeath (we explain 
this further in Section III). We do not test test whether these intentions were matched by 
action. For our purposes, it is intentions that count, not actual behaviour.1 The occurrence of a 
bequest cannot reveal to us the reason for leaving the bequest. While intentions allow us to 
uncover a causal relationship, actual bequests can at most enable us to establish a statistical 
relationship with other variables. For example, when an individual hurts someone, the act may 
be interpreted and evaluated in a variety of very distinct ways, depending, in particular, on 
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whether it was intentional or accidental. Similarly with regard to bequeathing. Put differently, 
intentions are an intermediary between exposure (here to inheriting) and future realizations of 
intended bequests, and as such, enable us to track causality. Another way of “framing” a 
possible concern with regard to our drawing inferences from plans to bequeath as opposed to 
from actual bequests, is to argue that when we do so, this is akin to drawing inferences in the 
context of attitudes towards the environment: in that context, people consider having a clean 
environment important, and state that they are willing to pay considerably for that. But when 
it comes to actual payment, an individual reasons that if he withholds payment, then this will 
not matter because his contribution, or lack of it, will have only a negligible impact on the 
corresponding financing and, thus, he elects to withhold payment. This type of “free-riding” 
on others, so to speak, clearly does not apply in the case of bequeathing. 
 
 Another possible concern regarding the adequacy of the data that we use is that people 
who are asked, first, whether they inherited and, second, whether they plan to bequeath, could 
be biased in their response to the second question as a consequence of the climate created by 
the first question. This framing could lead to instinctive reporting of intended bequests rather 
than to disclosure of carefully thought-through planned bequests. We consider this concern 
too not well founded. It is precisely the impression left by the experience of inheriting that we 
seek to capture, and it seems unreasonable that the response to a question related to such a 
serious matter as a plan to leave a bequest will be impulsive. Nonetheless, our Survey on 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) data source could be redesigned to 
address this issue also: people could be asked at one point in time about their inheritance 
experience and at another point in time, say a year, two years, or five years later, about their 
bequest plans. Our conjecture is that if such a survey protocol were to be invoked, the 
opposite of “fading” will be observed: the passage of time would enable people to gain 
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confidence in their ability to act on their bequest preferences by aligning their consumption 
and wealth accumulation to fit those preferences. Reasoned this way, the likelier finding will 
be amplification rather than “fading.” 
 
I. A BRIEF REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES 
Several studies that seek to explain why people make bequests do not take into account the 
idea that patterns of bequest behaviour are shaped by inheritance actions undertaken by 
preceding generations. Instead, bequeathing is attributed to altruism (Barro 1974; Becker 
1974; Wilhelm 1996). Some research supports the notion that bequests are compensatory 
(Tomes 1981) as predicted by the altruistic motive, whereas other studies do not (Menchik 
1980; Hurd 1997). The very notion that altruism entails compensatory bequests has also been 
challenged analytically (Stark and Zhang 2002). 
 
 Bernheim et al. (1985) develop the concept of strategic giving: bequests will be made 
to children only if the children meet parental care expectations; otherwise, bequests will be 
made to a third party. A disinherited child might claim the right to a share of the bequest (the 
so-called “forced share,” meaning a legal right to part of a deceased person’s estate). When 
the forced share is substantial, as is often the case in Europe, the threat of disinheritance is not 
credible and consequently cannot affect children’s behaviour. Moreover, parental altruism 
weakens the credibility of a threat to disinherit (Bernheim and Stark 1988). The empirical 
support for the hypothesis that bequests are used by parents to induce their offspring to 
provide care is mixed: some research confirms it (Angelini 2007), other studies reject it 
(Tomes 1981; Perozek 1998). 
 
 Because lifelong wealth can be consumed, bequeathed, or given as an inter-vivos 
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transfer, there is tension between the two types of support provided to children. Kessler and 
Masson (1989) note that some parents may prefer to finance college education, while others 
may choose to make a bequest, and that the main difference between the two means of 
financial support is the age of the children when they receive that support. McGarry (1999) 
argues that inter-vivos transfers depend on the current income of the child, whereas bequests 
depend on the child’s permanent income. Page (2003) finds evidence supporting the claim 
that higher inheritance tax rates significantly increase the giving of gifts in the USA. Other 
studies (Kolm 2006; Lundholm and Ohlsson 2000; Menchik and Jianakoplos 1998) attribute 
bequeathing to a variety of other factors. These and related studies are not structured to 
predict the size of planned bequests, the “replication effect” model of Cox and Stark (2005b) 
being an exception.  
 
 Another part of the literature argues that the size of bequests is essentially accidental. 
Uncertainty concerning the time of death induces risk-averse elderly people to save for future 
needs (Davies 1981). These individuals are unlikely to consume their entire wealth before 
dying, thus they end up bequeathing even when there was no intention to do so (Davies 1981; 
Abel 1985) - a bequest “by default,” so to speak. However, empirical findings appear to reject 
the accidental nature of bequests (Hurd 1997). This is a good reason to assume intentionality 
of bequests. 
 
 With regard to the direct role of wealth in explaining bequest behaviour, a widely held 
perception has been that wealth is a key player in the inclination to bequeath (Modigliani 
1988; Alessie et al. 1999), and that changes in the probability of leaving a bequest are 
significantly related to changes in wealth (Hurd and Smith 2001).  
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II. MODELING THE INCLINATION TO BEQUEATH 
Adherence to a family tradition implies mimicking parental behaviour: bequests confer utility 
not only because they “serve” altruism, but also on account of satisfaction from replication. 
The family tradition to bequeath is a channel through which the experience of inheriting 
impacts positively on the inclination to bequeath. Inheriting induces parents to bequeath to 
their children who, in turn, are inclined to bequeath to their own children. The model of a 
family tradition to bequeath is presented in the Appendix.  
 
 The family tradition model explains how an inclination to bequeath is acquired 
through or shaped by the experience of inheriting. The model can be represented heuristically 
as follows. Let there be two types of individuals in the population - type A individuals who 
derive utility from leaving a bequest, and type B individuals who do not- and let this 
preference be viewed as transmitted intergenerationally. Individuals who receive an 
inheritance are the children of parents of type A, are of type A themselves, and will thus plan 
to bequeath. Individuals who did not receive inheritances are children of parents of type B. An 
unambiguous distinction between types A and B can be made when all the potential 
bequeathers are already dead. If bequest plans are revealed to future heirs, then expressed 
expectations concerning the receipt of inheritances might help to identify the type of 
individual whose potential bequeathers are still alive. In fact, we might presume that in 
dynasties with a long-lasting family tradition, the plan to bequeath will be well known to 
future heirs. (In other words, the children of type A parents might be well aware of the 
prevailing family tradition to bequeath in their family.) 
 
 What role does wealth play in this context? If wealth as such were the driver of 
bequeathing, then an increase in wealth would lead to an increase in planned bequests. The 
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effect would be the same regardless of whether the individuals concerned were heirs or non-
heirs, that is, regardless of the source of their wealth. Our interest, however, is in finding out 
whether, holding wealth constant, the source of wealth exerts an impact on the inclination to 
bequeath. 
 
 Emphasizing the role of family tradition in bequest behaviour should not be 
interpreted as denying the role that altruism plays in prompting bequests. Yet even if altruism 
takes centre stage, the prediction that altruism will affect bequest behaviour is modified, in a 
clearly discernible way, when family tradition is taken into account. A simple way of 
incorporating the impact of the family tradition in a model of altruistic bequests and of 
highlighting the difference between the predictions emanating from an unconstrained 
altruistic model and from an altruistic cum family tradition model is presented in Section VI.  
 
III. THE DATA 
We draw on data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). 
The survey covers individuals aged 50 and over who live in 14 European countries, and in 
Israel. The first phase of data collection (wave 1) took place in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland in 2004/5, 
and in Israel in 2005/6. The second phase of data collection (wave 2) occurred in 2006/7 and 
covered the same countries as in wave 1, except for Israel. At the time of the second wave, the 
Czech Republic, Ireland, and Poland were added to the survey. Unfortunately, we cannot use 
data from subsequent waves 3 and 4 of SHARE because due to revisions to the questionnaire, 
these data do not provide any insight with regard to bequest intentions. 
 
 Because the parents of individuals younger than 50 are unlikely to have died, this 
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sample of individuals aged 50 and over is tailor-made for our study. The sample is limited to 
individuals who (reasonably) could have inherited either from a deceased parent or from a 
deceased parent-in-law. The research sample consists of individuals who simultaneously meet 
the following criteria: death of at least one parent or parent-in-law; presence of at least one 
child; reported “chances” (a term used in the questionnaire) to bequeath;2 and information on 
the experience of inheriting. There are two types of individuals: those who were interviewed 
in the two waves, and those who were interviewed in only one wave. Individuals of the first 
type constitute our panel research sample, whereas individuals of the second type constitute 
our cross-section research sample. 
 
 Of all SHARE respondents, 98.3% answered the question on the chances to leave any 
bequest. Application of the demographic selection criteria listed in the preceding paragraph 
yielded a sample of 33,432 individuals. Individuals who did not provide unambiguous 
information on the experience of inheriting were excluded from the analysis, reducing the 
sample by about 9%, leaving us with a sample of 30,411 individuals. 
 
 All the individuals who inherited money, goods, or property valued at more than 
5,000 euros were classified as heirs. Heirs constitute 14% of wave 2 of the panel research 
sample, and 13% of the cross-section research sample. The country-specific “incidences” of 
heirs are reported in Appendix Table A2. To the best of our knowledge, no administrative data 
on the fraction of heirs in the population of European countries are available for comparison 
with the information elicited from SHARE. No universal relationship between bequest 
behaviour and house ownership is found in SHARE countries. The vast majority of heirs 
(more than 96%, cf. Table A3 in the Appendix) inherited a house in Poland. The percentage of 
heirs in Ireland, the Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, Austria, and Germany who inherited a 
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house is above the sample average (67% and 73% in the panel and cross-section, 
respectively). Heirs who inherited a house are least frequent in Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden (at most 31% of heirs). 
 
 Answers to questions on the “chances” to bequeath anything and on the “chances” to 
bequeath 50,000 euros or more show how the inclination to bequeath varies. Combined 
information on the chances to bequeath anything, at least 50,000 euros, and at least 
150,000 euros, captures the distribution of the expected amounts of bequests. A stronger 
inclination to bequeath leads to a larger sum of the desired bequest if bequeathable resources 
allow that. However, in the case of individuals who are severely restricted in terms of 
bequeathable wealth, a strong inclination to bequeath can be accompanied by relatively small 
desired bequests. Because we seek to distinguish between individuals according to the 
strength of their willingness to bequeath, and not with respect to the sum of their expected or 
desired bequests, we refer to individuals who report a positive chance of bequeathing as 
individuals who intend to bequeath. Individuals who report a zero chance of bequeathing are 
referred to as individuals who do not intend to bequeath. Table 1 presents percentages of heirs 
and non-heirs with an intention to bequeath and without an intention to bequeath in the panel 
research sample, and in the cross-section research sample. In congruence with the 
hypothesized positive link between the experience of inheriting and the inclination to 
bequeath, the numbers along the main diagonal in each part of Table 1 are larger: the fraction 
of individuals planning to bequeath is higher for heirs than for non-heirs by 17 percentage 
points in the panel research sample, and by 19 percentage points in the cross-section research 
sample. Interestingly, almost the same edge of 18 percentage points was observed in the USA 
for individuals born in 1931-1941 with at least one deceased parent (Cox and Stark 2005a). 
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Table 1: Percentages of heirs and non-heirs with and without the intention to bequeath in the 
panel, and in the cross-section research samples 
  Panel Cross-section 
 
Intention  
to bequeath 
No intention  
to bequeath 
Intention  
to bequeath 
No intention 
 to bequeath 
Heirs 88.71 11.29 89.14 10.86 
Non-heirs 71.27 28.73 70.31 29.69 
Source: SHARE waves 1 and 2, release 2-5-0. 
Note: For the panel research sample, the reported percentages are from wave 2. Number of 
heirs: 2,192 (panel) and 3,371 (cross-section). Number of non-heirs: 14,026 (panel), and 
26,662 (cross-section). 
 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of heirs and non-heirs in the panel and cross-
section research samples. As can be seen in the Table, non-heirs are slightly older than heirs. 
This corresponds to the fact that the older non-heirs are more likely to have parents who lost 
their lifelong wealth in the Second World War than the somewhat younger heirs. Not 
surprisingly, the fraction of non-heirs with a living parent is larger than the corresponding 
fraction of heirs. This helps to explain why the percentage of individuals with the expectation 
of inheriting - that is, those reporting positive chances to receive any inheritance in the ten 
years following the interview - is significantly larger among the thus far non-heirs than among 
heirs. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of heirs and non-heirs in the panel and the cross-section 
research samples 
 Panel  Cross-section  
 Heirs Non-heirs  Heirs Non-heirs  
Averages       
Age 66.56 67.01 *** 66.23 66.82 *** 
Number of children 2.33 2.47 *** 2.31 2.48 *** 
Financial transfers to children 6164 5704  5513 4890  
Financial transfers from children  1423 1530  1655 1501  
Real assets 271.5 218.0 *** 267.9 217.1 *** 
Financial assets 981.9 983.4  735.1 712.9 ** 
Liabilities 55.0 56.2  55.3 55.3  
Net wealth 1234.3 1228.8  890.3 887.5  
Inheritances 194.8 0.0  196.4 0.0  
Expected inheritances 37.5 37.6  38.2 37.7  
Percentages       
Parent alive 15.82 19.47 *** 15.67 20.06 *** 
Expectation of inheriting 14.86 19.96 *** 19.31 21.15 ** 
Female 54.36 58.25 ** 53.20 58.03 *** 
Married 63.56 58.85  65.45 59.57 *** 
Widowed 29.51 28.46  27.31 29.21 ** 
Never married or divorced 6.93 12.69 *** 7.24 11.22 *** 
Retired 23.78 21.40 *** 24.29 21.65 *** 
Working 52.47 54.33 *** 51.46 53.86 *** 
Unemployed 2.63 3.59 * 2.78 3.63 ** 
Inactive 21.12 20.68  21.47 20.86  
Provided transfers to children 24.64 19.98 *** 24.31 18.11 *** 
Received transfer from children 3.60 3.32  3.19 2.98  
Number of observations 2,192 14,834  3,753 26,658  
Source: SHARE waves 1 and 2, release 2-5-0. 
Note: For the panel research sample, the reported values and percentages are from wave 2. Significance of the 
difference between heirs and non-heirs: * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Reported are financial transfers 
valued at least 250 Euros that occurred in the 12 months preceding the interview in case of interviews conducted 
for the first time or since the last interview in the case of subsequent interviews. Assets, liabilities, inheritances, 
expected inheritances (if positive), and net wealth are expressed in thousand Euros. 
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 Although heirs are more likely to be married or to be in registered partnership than 
non-heirs, they have on average fewer children than non-heirs. This difference cannot be 
explained by the fact that heirs are slightly younger than non-heirs because the number of 
children is not likely to rise significantly with time for individuals in the research samples 
aged 50 or above. The complex tension between the choices of lifelong consumption, the 
number of children, planned bequests, and other intergenerational transfers is beyond the 
limited scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the difference between the average number of 
children of heirs and the average number of children of non-heirs raises a somewhat 
speculative question: could a strong inclination to bequeath affect individual fertility 
decisions? Perhaps it could be reasoned that individuals with a family tradition of bequeathing 
prefer having children over not having children, so that they can fulfil the tradition, but they 
also prefer to have fewer children so as to avoid their bequest plans being threatened as rising 
lifetime child-rearing costs severely bite into their bequeathable resources. (We revisit this 
issue in the historical case study presented in the Appendix.) 
 
There are more retired heirs than retired non-heirs, and fewer heirs are employed or 
self-employed than non-heirs. A similar correlation between inheritance and retirement was 
found in a study by Brown et al. (2010). This observation might reflect international 
differences in the prevalence of heirs and in retirement ages (Table A2). Even though many 
respondents made retirement decisions before 2004, we can reasonably assume that to an 
extent, international differences in pension eligibility in 2004 reflect past differences. 
Interestingly, we do not observe a greater frequency of heirs in the richer countries. 
 
 For individuals declaring positive chances to receive an inheritance in the ten years 
following the interview, the expected amount of inheritances was computed. Information on 
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the chances of inheriting any amount and on the chances to inherit at least 50,000 euros in the 
ten years following the interview allows us to estimate the amount of expected inheritances, 
assuming normal distribution, in line with a procedure proposed by Manski (2004). The 
amount of expected inheritances does not differ between heirs and non-heirs who anticipate 
inheriting in the ten years following the interview. But the incidence does. 
 
 The SHARE data do not include information on total wealth. Respondents were asked 
about four types of real assets (“primary residences” and “other residences,” “own 
businesses,” and “vehicles”), seven types of financial assets (“bank and other transaction 
accounts,” “government and corporate bonds,” “stocks,” “mutual funds,” “individual 
retirement accounts,” “contractual savings for housing,” and “life insurance policies”), and 
three types of liabilities (“debt on cars and other vehicles,” “debt on credit cards or store 
cards,” and “loans from bank, building society or other financial institution”). Refusal to reply 
to financial questions is not a rarity, so it is likely that in a good number of cases, when it 
comes to wealth components, the incidence of non-response is substantial.  
 
 We used the information from the responses to the questions listed above to calculate 
real assets, financial assets, and liabilities. Non-response to these questions resulted in the 
percentages of individuals with computed real assets, computed financial assets, and 
computed liabilities not exceeding 73%, 56%, and 69% of the research samples, respectively. 
With respect to the incidence of non-response, there is no difference between heirs and non-
heirs. Net wealth could be calculated as the sum of real and financial assets adjusted for 
liabilities if all three aggregates were available. Descriptive statistics of the subsample of 
individuals with computed information on household net wealth (available on request) differs 
considerably from the descriptive statistics of the full sample. The problem of missing data on 
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net wealth is addressed by resorting to multiple imputations. The SHARE data include five 
imputed values of household net wealth obtained in the fully conditional specification method 
(van Buuren et al. 2006). The method employs a Markov chain Monte Carlo technique, 
namely Gibbs sampling with data augmentation (Little and Rubin 2002), and uses information 
on ranges within which the amount of a particular wealth component falls. The multiplicity of 
imputations ensures consistency, not only of the first moment of the distribution of net wealth, 
but also of the second moment (Juster and Smith 1997; Christelis et al. 2005). Detailed 
description of the imputation procedure in waves 1 and 2 of SHARE is provided by Christelis 
(2011). 
 
 On average, household real assets are significantly larger in the group of heirs than in 
the group of non-heirs, and these assets are more evenly distributed among heirs than among 
non-heirs. Heirs seem to have slightly more liabilities than non-heirs in the cross-section 
research sample. As far as financial assets and household net wealth are concerned, heirs do 
not differ from non-heirs. The preliminary observations on the distribution of household net 
wealth already suggest that net wealth does not credibly explain why the fraction of heirs 
intending to bequeath is larger than the fraction of non-heirs intending to bequeath. 
 
IV. THE TESTING PROCEDURE 
Using the SHARE data, we inquire how, other things held constant, the behaviour of heirs 
who, by definition, were exposed to bequeathing by the preceding generation differs from the 
behaviour of non-heirs who, again by definition, did not receive bequests. We control for the 
expectation of inheriting in the ten years following the interview. Do the experience of 
inheriting and the expectation of inheriting find their match in an inclination to bequeath? In 
the first subsection we delineate the methods used in our testing procedure; in the second 
subsection we describe the empirical implementation of these methods. 
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ESTIMATION METHODS  
The estimation strategy takes into account potential non-random selection to becoming an 
heir. In addition, even though there are only two waves of the survey, our analysis tries to 
exploit the longitudinal nature of the data. If heirs and non-heirs do not systematically differ 
with respect to relevant variables, then the simplest estimation methods are suitable for our 
purposes. We seek to explain the inclination to bequeath using linear estimation (OLS) for the 
cross-section data. In the panel research sample, we conduct linear estimations using random 
effects (RE) as indicated by the Hausman test. 
 
 If the selection into groups of heirs and non-heirs is not random, then the impact of the 
experience of inheriting will differ between actual heirs and individuals from the population 
of interest who could become heirs (Imbens and Angrist 1994; Wooldridge 2002). Descriptive 
statistics presented in Section III points to systematic (though not profound) differences 
between heirs and non-heirs, implying that the sample selection problem cannot be swept 
away. We address this problem by means of a difference-in-differences (DD) estimation for 
the panel data (Ashenfelter and Card 1985; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009a) and propensity 
score matching (PSM) for the cross-section data (Rubin 1974; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; 
Imbens and Wooldridge 2009b). The method of DD assumes that becoming an heir is 
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic errors of the adjustments of planned bequests. The fixed 
effects (FE) estimation for the balanced panel allows us to isolate the pure effect of becoming 
an heir, distinct from other effects that might arise due to biased comparisons between heirs 
and non-heirs (Wooldridge 2005). For relatively large samples, the DD estimation is efficient. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case in our study. 
 
 The PSM method can be applied, provided that the selection into groups of heirs and 
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non-heirs depends only on observables (the unconfoundedness assumption). The family 
tradition model implies that whether a child becomes an heir depends on observable 
characteristics of the child’s parents. Unfortunately, the unconfoundedness assumption cannot 
be tested directly (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009b). Nonetheless, PSM is the most reliable of 
the four estimation methods. 
 
 The propensity score PSl is the probability that an individual l is an heir. We 
investigate the PSl using logistic estimation (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The following 
explanatory variables were used: gender, being an only child, age at the time of death of the 
deceased father, dummies for the last occupation of the deceased father, dummies for the last 
occupation of the deceased mother, dummies for the respondent’s level of education, and 
dummies for countries. The coefficients of the explanatory variables obtained in the 
estimation of the PSl are reported in Appendix Table A4. The predicted propensity score for 
heirs meets the common support criterion, as it overlaps fully with the predicted propensity 
score for non-heirs. There are different techniques of propensity score matching. In this paper 
we run seven random draws because such a procedure exploits fully the size of the subsample 
of non-heirs, and is insensitive to the sequence of matching. The derived estimates are used to 
compute a predicted propensity score, which in turn is used to select individuals into groups 
of heirs and non-heirs (Hirano et al. 2003). This allows us to obtain a group of heirs and a 
group of non-heirs such that the most severe biases of OLS estimates for heirs and non-heirs 
are eliminated (Heckman 1990; Rubin 1990).  
 
 In sum, we apply two approaches (random, and non-random selection of the group of 
heirs) to the two types of data (panel and cross-section) to generate four linear estimation 
procedures. In the random selection approach we conduct random effects for the panel data 
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(RE), and ordinary least squares for the cross-section data (OLS). In the non-random selection 
approach we conduct fixed effects in the difference-in-differences procedure for the panel 
data (DD), and ordinary least squares in the propensity score matching for the cross-section 
data (PSM). We do not anticipate profound differences between OLS and PSM results 
because the raw data do not point to such differences. 
 
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
The pairs of groups of heirs and non-heirs defined for each of the estimation methods create 
four research samples {panel,DD,cross-section,PSM}S = . The impact of inheriting on the 
intention to bequeath is estimated for each research sample, using the respective estimation 
method.  
 
 SHARE employs the subjective probability approach to the measurement of 
expectations, as developed by Manski (2004). Table A5 in the Appendix presents percentages 
of heirs and non-heirs who reported that their chances of bequeathing are 100 for all three 
questions pertaining to bequest intentions by net wealth deciles. Two observations are worth 
noting. First, the proportion of individuals above the seventh decile declaring 100 chances of 
bequeathing is lower than 67%. This indicates that there is substantial variation in chances to 
bequeath at the top of the wealth distribution. Second, the majority of heirs in the first, 
second, and third decile groups report 100 chances to leave some bequests, whereas respective 
figures for non-heirs are statistically significantly lower ( 0.01p < ). This finding supports the 
prevalence of a family tradition to bequeath.  
 
We draw on direct responses to two questions: all the individuals were asked to state 
the chances that they will bequeath at least 50,000 euros. Those who answered that this 
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chance was zero were subsequently asked to state their chance of bequeathing anything at all. 
None of the variables “produced” by these questions is ready-made for testing our research 
question. Therefore we elected to let the inclination to bequeath be equal to the chances to 
bequeath anything, and take the value of 100 if the chance of bequeathing at least 
50,000 euros is positive. A set of alternative measures based on responses to the questions 
with higher thresholds yields results similar to the ones reported in the paper.3 Table 3 
provides details of our operationalization of the inclination to bequeath. The averages and 
standard errors of the inclination to bequeath are similar in all research samples. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the inclination to bequeath in the research samples 
 Inclination to bequeath 
 Panel DD Cross-section PSM 
Average 79.77 78.19 78.87 77.87 
Standard deviation 38.08 38.83 38.68 39.62 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 100 100 100 100 
Number of 
observations 16,911 5,758 30,209 9,989 
Source: SHARE waves 1 and 2, release 2-5-0. 
Note: For the P and DD research samples, the reported values are from wave 2. 
 
 The variable “inclination to bequeath” is quasi-continuous, with an upper bound (100) 
and a lower bound (0). For this reason, we apply the inverse sine function transformation 
yielding dependent variable “intention to bequeath” that can be accurately explained using 
linear estimations. The estimations are performed using a vector of J explanatory variables Six  
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in each of the four methods, according to the equation: 
,S S S Sit it itIB ε= +x β  for individual i observed t times 
1,2 {panel, DD}
1 {cross-section, PSM}
if S
t
if S
=!
= "
=#
, 
where SitIB  is the intention to bequeath for individual i observed at time t in sample S, Sβ  is a 
vector of coefficients Sjβ  on the impact of variable j on the intention to bequeath in sample S, 
and Sitε  is an identically and independently distributed random term for individual i observed 
at time t in sample S. 
 
 In what follows, the hypothesis of the impact of family tradition on bequest behaviour 
is tested by asking whether, when estimating the intention to bequeath, the coefficients on the 
experience of inheriting and on the expectation of receiving any inheritance during the ten 
years following the interview are positive, controlling for other relevant variables; namely, 
whether inheriting 0Sβ > , expectation 0Sβ >  in sample S. Because the estimation controls for the 
household net wealth including expected inheritances, the coefficients inheritingSβ  and expectationSβ  
represent solely the role of inheriting that had been already experienced or is expected to 
occur, respectively. 
 
V. RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION 
Table 4 reports selected results of linear regressions of the intention to bequeath for heirs and 
for non-heirs. The regressions control for household net wealth including expected 
inheritances (expected net wealth), transfers provided to and received from children after 
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, and other relevant variables including age, gender, 
marital status, and employment status. We consider three regions: South (Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Israel), Central (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Poland, 
Switzerland), and North (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden).4 In the case of the panel 
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research sample, random effects (RE) estimations were chosen over fixed effects (FE) 
according to the results of the Hausman test. 
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Table 4: Results obtained in the linear estimations of the intention to bequeath with five 
multiple imputations of household net wealth 
Intention to bequeath Panel (RE) Cross-section DD (FE) PSM 
  Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. 
Experience of inheriting .377*** (.043) .321*** (.032) .633 (.682) .306*** (.035) 
Expectation of inheriting .547*** .(036) .470*** (.025) .547*** (.049) .466*** (.028) 
Trans. expected net wealth .198*** (.004) .192*** (.006) .205*** (.006) .192*** (.007) 
Trans. received transfers .007 (.012) .003 (.010) -.005 (.017) .004 (.011) 
Trans. provided transfers .044*** (.005) .037*** (.003) .048*** (.006) .036*** (.003) 
Log number of children -.252*** (.030) -.245*** (.029) -.278*** (.042) -.211*** (.032) 
Inheritance tax .004** (.002) .005*** (.002) -.008*** (.003) .007*** (.002) 
Age .002 (.002) .001 (.002) .004 (.003) -.001 (.002) 
Female -.009 (.031) -.015 (.026) .004 (.043) -.022 (.029) 
Married .279*** (.050) .252*** (.044) .379*** (.070) .233*** (.049) 
Widowed .090 (.058) .105* (.053) .175** (.080) .098* (.059) 
Working .222*** (.040) .209*** (.038) .219*** (.054) .207*** (.044) 
Retired .278*** (.045) .286*** (.040) .265*** (.063) .256*** (.045) 
South .405*** (.038) .329*** (.035) .375*** (.048) .336*** (.040) 
Central .142*** (.037) .102*** (.030) .328*** (.051) .060* (.034) 
Wald/LR test 179.5***  140.5***  97.3***  110.7***  
Number of observations 16,590  20,373  9,018  15,758  
Source: SHARE waves 1 and 2, release 2-5-0.  
Note: * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Trans: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (θ=1). Coeff.: 
coefficient. S.e.: standard error. Ref. group: The inactive or unemployed single men with at most ISCED level 1 
of the least educated child, not receiving nor providing financial transfers to children, living in the North. 
Estimations with constant term control for the receipt of financial transfers from children, the provision of 
financial transfers to children, 6 ISCED education levels of the least educated child, and having a daughter in all 
estimations. South (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Israel), Central (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
France, Poland, Switzerland), and North (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden). PSM: 7 random draws. Fuller 
results are available on request. 
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 The coefficient on a dummy for the expectation to receive inheritances in the ten years 
following the interview is significantly positive (at the 0.01 significance level) in all the 
estimations, and the coefficient on the experience of inheriting is significantly positive in all 
but one of the estimations, namely except for the fixed effects regression in the DD method. 
We discuss the insignificant coefficient in the DD sample below. The positive impact of 
actual and expected inheriting in the three research samples supports the notion that family 
tradition to bequeath affects the intention to bequeath. It is noteworthy that the significant 
coefficient is obtained in an estimation controlling for net wealth including expected amounts 
of inheritances that the respondents believe they will receive in the ten years following the 
interview, along with other explanatory variables. This means that the experience of inheriting 
increases the intention to bequeath on top of any possible increase arising from a higher 
household expected net wealth.  
 
 Additional PSM estimations (not displayed here) with numerically calculated standard 
errors using kernel weights and nearest neighbour as alternatives to the random draws 
matching technique confirm that the experience of inheriting and the expectation of inheriting 
strengthen significantly the intention to bequeath.  
 
 The lack of significance of the experience of inheriting in the DD research sample 
arises, most probably, from the number of individuals who became heirs (244) within the 
short observation span of two years, yielding a proportion (1.38%) too small to reveal any 
statistically significant relation. In contrast to actual inheriting, the variable reflecting the 
expectation to receive inheritances in the ten years following the interview captures properly 
whether or not one belongs to a family with a tradition of bequeathing. 
 
 In sum, the prevalence of a positive relationship between the experience of inheriting 
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and the intention to bequeath is supported. The family tradition to bequeath impacts positively 
on the intention to bequeath on top of any positive impact of expected net wealth. The impact 
of inheriting is larger than the impact of being married, working, or retired. So is the impact 
of the expectation to inherit. The econometric results reaffirm what was clearly gleaned by the 
“naked eye” (cf. Table 1): heirs are more likely to be inclined to bequeath than non-heirs, a 
relation that holds when other relevant covariates are controlled for.  
 
VI. COMPLEMENTARY CONSIDERATIONS 
AN UNCONSTRAINED ALTRUISTIC MODEL PITTED AGAINST AN 
ALTRUISTIC CUM FAMILY TRADITION MODEL 
Let the utility function of an individual take the form ( , ) (1 ) ln lnU c b c bα α= − + , where ( )U ⋅  is 
twice differentiable and concave, 0 1α< <  is the altruism weight, c is the individual’s lifetime 
consumption, b is the bequest that the individual leaves, and w c b= +   is  the individual’s 
wealth, where all variables are expressed in present-value terms. Because  
2
2 2 2
1 1and 0U a U
b c b b c b
α α α "#∂ − ∂ −
= − + = − − < &'' &∂ ∂( )
, 
it follows that *b , the optimal level of b, is *b wα=  (see Figure 1). If the initial level of w 
is 0 ,w  then bequests are set at *0b , and if the level of wealth declines to 1,w then bequests are set 
at *1b . 
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Figure 1: Altruism, replication, and bequests 
 
 The family tradition effect places a floor on bequests, say at . With the effect present, 
a wealth decline from 0w to 1w entails a decline in bequests by less than ,wα Δ that is, only to . 
Of course, attenuation of the decline in the level of bequests will not arise for all reductions in 
wealth; it would not follow if wealth were to decline from 0w  to 2 ,w  for example. 
 
 One reason why the giving of bequests is conditioned by the receipt of an inheritance 
could be dynastic altruism. If altruism is a trait that individuals receive and pass on 
(somewhat akin to a gene), then the altruism that guided t in bequeathing to 1t +  will likewise 
guide 1t +  in bequeathing to 2t + . While the possibility that altruism is an intergenerational 
factor cannot be ignored (Stark 1999), it is hard to see why altruism should consistently 
manifest itself in the specific form of bequests: we would expect altruism to give rise to t  
giving to 1t + , not to a particular type of giving by t. Moreover, if a high degree of dynastic 
altruism results in a dynasty creating and accumulating more wealth than a low degree of 
dynastic altruism (Falk and Stark 2001), then altruism, wealth, and bequests will co-vary. Yet 
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our data suggest that the correlation between inheriting and the intention to bequeath is 
neither confined to nor more pronounced at high levels of wealth. 
 
AN APPLICATION OF THE FAMILY TRADITION APPROACH TO CHARITABLE 
BEQUESTS 
In a dynamic economy, the reason why the wealthy give to charity is that they are likely to 
have obeyed the family traditions “constraint” and are therefore freer to engage in charitable 
giving. 
 
 Comparing the wealthy in Europe with the wealthy in the USA, two features stand out. 
First, the wealthy in Europe are less likely to give to charity than the wealthy in the USA. 
Second, the wealthy in Europe are more likely to have their wealth originate in family firms. 
The family tradition effect provides a connection and an explanation. On average, the wealthy 
in the USA are more likely to have accumulated their fortunes in their own lifetime. On 
average, the wealthy in Europe are more likely to have inherited their wealth. Consequently, 
when it comes to the free disposition of wealth, the wealthy in Europe are more constrained 
by the mandate of the family tradition effect than their counterparts in the USA.  
 
 The July 31, 2004 issue of The Economist magazine ran a special report on 
philanthropy. Inter alia, the report made the following disjoint observations: “on both sides of 
the Atlantic … more and more people have more money than they want to leave to their kids;” 
“volunteering turns out to be particularly high in [several European countries]. In America, 
the balance between gifts of time and cash is more equal … than in most of Europe;” “as the 
size of estates rises, the proportion going to heirs shrinks and the share left to charity 
increases;” “Could it be that today’s rich think that [bequeathing] too much money harms 
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their children?” (pp. 48–50). Although the report explains each observation separately, it falls 
short of providing a unifying reasoning. Our approach can provide such reasoning. 
 
 The notion that “people have more money than they would like to leave to their kids” 
is questionable: it is unclear a priori why the additional money that people have should not be 
bequeathed to their children. Our approach suggests that it is not “more money” as such that 
prompts the giving (to charity) as opposed to bequeathing, but rather that it is the composition 
by source of the available money wherein a higher fraction does not originate in inheritances. 
Given our perspective, perhaps the quote could be rewritten: “people have more money than 
they feel bound to leave to their kids.” 
 
 Indeed, a reason for volunteering being more prevalent in Europe than in the USA is 
that because of the higher incidence of wealth in Europe being “dynastic wealth,” given the 
inclination or the desire to give to others rather than to one’s children, people in Europe are 
more constrained by their legacy of inheritance in bequeathing to others rather than to their 
children than people in the USA. 
 
 Our reasoning further implies, then, that the often-quoted main reason for Americans 
giving more to charities than Europeans may not be the “kinder tax treatment” in the USA. 
 
 Our approach also enables us to shed a different light on the observation that “as the 
size of estates rises, the proportion going to heirs shrinks.” Our approach suggests that it is 
intertemporal variation, not cross-sectional variation, that accounts for the shifting of the 
relative weights. It is the rise in the size of the estates over time - which gives rise to a 
“surplus” of bequeathable wealth over inherited wealth - that facilitates a larger allocation to 
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charitable giving, rather than a perception that “bequeathing too much may harm children.” 
 
 On a related note: there is plenty of evidence that the nouveau riche in Russia, 
especially in Moscow, practise conspicuous consumption on an extravagant scale. This 
behaviour coincides with large sections of the Russian population becoming poorer. There is 
no culture in present-day Russia of community service and social responsibility, as the social 
attitudes of the Soviet era remain largely intact. The newly-acquired private wealth is not used 
for charitable purposes. In principle, only a little of the newly-acquired private wealth could 
have been consumed, with the bulk earmarked for bequests. Under communist rule, the 
ownership of private property was prohibited, and there was no tradition of transferring 
private property intergenerationally. Thus, the prevailing extreme level of consumption may 
be due partly to the absence of a culture of social responsibility and moral restraint, and partly 
to the absence of an inheritance experience and a bequest tradition. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS, AND REFLECTIONS ON FOLLOW-UP RESEARCH 
We explored the idea that the intention to bequeath is influenced by a family tradition of 
bequeathing. A sample of individuals aged 50 and over with at least one deceased parent or 
parent-in-law and with at least one child drawn from SHARE data was used to test whether 
there is a positive correlation between having inherited or expecting to inherit and the 
inclination to bequeath, keeping other relevant factors constant.  
 
 Our main finding is that family tradition explicated via inheritances has a positive 
impact on the inclination to bequeath, controlling for net expected wealth, financial inter-
vivos transfers to and from children, and other relevant variables. Our finding aligns with the 
idea that the receipt of inheritances signals belonging to a family that is conscious of a 
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tradition to bequeath. In such families, the traits of bequest behaviour are well-known and 
anticipated. The results confirming the role of the family tradition, controlling for net wealth, 
imply that it is not the case that the wealthier necessarily bequeath more because they have 
more to bequeath. The results suggest that policymakers who seek to modify bequest 
behaviour have to recognize that in societies in which the experience of inheriting affects the 
bequest behaviour of a large fraction of the population, the effectiveness of inheritance taxes 
could well be muted. 
 
 The significance of our approach arises not only from the light that it sheds on the role 
of inheriting in the determination of whether to bequeath and how much to bequeath, but also 
because it suggests an explanation for other aspects of bequest behaviour. For example, Light 
and McGarry (2004) seek to find out what explains the deviation of mothers from the norm of 
equal bequests, a category that covers 8% of mothers in the USA, according to a 1999 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women and Mature Women. Light and McGarry 
(2004) do not consider as an explanation the possibility that these mothers have themselves 
experienced an unequal division of inheritances.  
 
 In another “mothers” study, Fernandéz et al. (2004) argue that a significant 
determinant of the gradual but steady increase in women’s involvement in the formal labour 
market was the increasing number of men who grew up in a family in which their mother 
worked. In this way, women who worked set an example for their sons, and thus made it 
easier for the next generation of women to follow in their footsteps. Fernandéz et al. (2004) 
show that the probability that a man’s wife works is positively and significantly correlated 
with whether his mother worked. This approach and finding parallel ours not only in that 
behavioural patterns are transferred intergenerationally, but also in that in the Fernandéz et al. 
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(2004) study, the search for an explanation is not confined to the standard determinants of 
women’s participation in the labour market (such as the liberating effects of new consumer 
durables that greatly decreased the amount of work required to run a household, the 
revolutionary effect of the oral contraceptive, and the expansion of the service sector with its 
attendant white-collar jobs); in our study, the search for an explanation for planned bequests is 
not confined to wealth.  
 
 Related interesting questions that could be addressed in future research include 
whether the impact of inheriting on the intention to bequeath differs with respect to the 
relationship between the testator and the heir. Does the intention to bequeath depend on 
whether the receipt of an inheritance was via a will or without a will? What is the effect of the 
composition of inheritances on the incidence and composition of planned bequests? Our 
additional estimations yielded an insignificant coefficient on house inheritance, which 
suggests that the house as a form of inheritance does not affect the intention to bequeath. 
However, it may affect the desired form of planned bequests. Further analysis of this issue 
could shed light on the processes of transmitting the family tradition to bequeath. Testing the 
hypothesis that individuals with less non-inherited wealth will leave a larger bequest to 
children of lower ability than individuals with more non-inherited wealth, as presented in the 
model in the Appendix, deserves separate analysis once datasets including both the incomes 
of children and the wealth of parents become available. 
 
In addition, longitudinal data over a longer time span might improve the accuracy of the 
estimates of the long-term role that inter-vivos transfers between parents and children play in 
the formation of the intention to bequeath, as well as estimates of the impact of unanticipated 
changes in inheritance tax rates. The amount of intended bequests also deserves detailed 
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analysis once more refined data become available. The accuracy of the estimates of expected 
bequests that could be derived from the subjective probabilities to bequeath amounts that 
exceed given thresholds is limited in SHARE because only two thresholds were used, and the 
feasibility of the normality assumption is disputable. Finally, if maintaining a family tradition 
to bequeath is considered important, then people will adjust their consumption in situations of 
significant changes in the value of their assets, for instance a substantial fall in the value of 
their share holdings. It will be intriguing to explore the link between a “duty” to bequeath on 
the one hand, and the value of assets, level of consumption, and possibly even labour market 
engagement on the other. Here, almost a counterintuitive result could be found: rather than the 
receipt of a (large) inheritance leading to a reduction in employment, under a family-tradition-
mandated commitment to bequeath, an adverse shock to asset value could induce (or 
reinforce) a positive labour supply response. 
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APPENDIX 
MODELING THE FAMILY TRADITION TO BEQUEATH  
Let pY  be the parent’s lifelong income, let I be the inheritance received by the parent, let B be 
the bequest to the child, and let kY  be the income of the child (k for kid). Let the parent’s 
utility U positively depend on his or her own consumption Y I B+ − , on the consumption of the 
child kY B+ , and on upholding a family tradition. Then the parent’s utility function is given by 
ln( ) ln[( ) ( )]p kU Y I B Y B B Iα β γ= + − + + + − , 
where , , 0α β γ >  are parameters. The parameter γ  measures the effect of “family tradition” on 
bequest behaviour. Bequeathing the same as inheriting or more confers satisfaction; 
bequeathing less than inheriting reduces utility. With these preferences, the case of pure 
altruism (no family tradition effect) is a special case in which 0γ = .  
 
 Suppose that we find out that individuals who inherit more tend to bequeath more. If 
mere wealth were the determinant of planned bequests, then an increase in wealth arising 
from a surge in the value of assets or savings occurring because of, say, a stock market boom 
or because of inheritance, should have the same impact on planned bequests. But if it is the 
source of the wealth that matters, then we will not observe the same impact. On receipt of an 
inheritance, individuals may interpret their role towards their children differently than on 
amassing the same amount by means of their own toil; they could consider it only fair not to 
leave less than they received themselves, or they could interpret their role as custodians, that 
is, recipients, holders, and “transferers” of the dynastic wealth, humbly asserting that they live 
for only a fraction of the dynasty’s “lifetime,” and have a moral duty to act as intertemporal 
purveyors or conveyers of the dynastic assets. 
 
 Consider a parent who chooses the amount of bequests such as to maximize U. We 
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express the parent’s utility as a function of bequests: 
( ) ln( ) ln[( ) ( )]p kU B Y I B Y B B Iα β γ= + − + + + − . 
Then 
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( ) ( )p k
U B
Y I B Y B B I
γ
α β
γ
− +
% = +
+ − + + −
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2 2
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(that is, the second-order condition for a unique maximum holds). We have that 
( ) 0U B! =   
if and only if 
[( ) ( )] (1 )[ ] 0k pY B B I Y I Bα γ β γ− + + − + + + − = , 
or if and only if 
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Four predictions can be obtained from the model.  
 
Prediction 1 A stronger family tradition results in a larger bequest, other things held 
constant: 
2
(1 )( )
( )(1 ) ( )
0
( )(1 )
p k
k
Y I I Y
I YB
β γ αγ α
α β γ α
γ γ α β γ
∗
+ + + −& '
∂ ) *+ + +∂ + ,= = >
∂ ∂ + +
. 
This relationship leads us to hypothesize that other things held constant, adherence to family 
tradition will result in a larger optimal bequest. Thus, other things held constant, planned 
bequests of heirs (individuals with a family tradition of bequeathing) are expected to be larger 
than planned bequests of non-heirs (individuals without a family tradition of bequeathing), 
because for heirs 0γ > , whereas for non-heirs 0γ = . 
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Prediction 2 For a given wealth ,PY I W+ =  the receipt of a larger inheritance leads to 
leaving a larger bequest: 
*
(1 )
( )(1 )
0
( )(1 )
kW I Y
B
I I
β γ αγ α
α β γ αγ
α β γ
+ + −% &
∂( )+ +∂ * += = >
∂ ∂ + +
. 
(When wealth is not given,  
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Prediction 3 Under family tradition, the receipt of a larger inheritance increases optimal 
bequest by more than the receipt (the gaining) of a larger non-inherited wealth. 
 
 Rewrite the optimal bequest as 
( )(1 ) (1 )
( )(1 )
p kY I YB
β γ β γ αγ α
α β γ
∗
+ + + + −
=
+ +
. 
 If inheritance increases by Δ , then the optimal bequest is 
( )(1 ) (1 ) ( )
( )
( )(1 )
p kY I YB I
β γ β γ αγ α
α β γ
∗
+ + + + + Δ −
+ Δ =
+ +
, 
and it increases by 
( )(1 )
( )
( )(1 )
B I B
β γ αγ
α β γ
∗ ∗ + + Δ+Δ − =
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. 
 If non-inherited wealth increases by Δ , then the optimal bequest is 
( )(1 )( ) (1 )
( )
( )(1 )
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p
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β γ β γ αγ α
α β γ
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+ + Δ + + + −
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and it increases by 
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B Y B β γ
α β γ
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. 
Thus, 
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Prediction 4 The sensitivity of the optimal bequest to inheritance is increasing in family 
tradition. This result holds regardless of whether or not total wealth is held constant; for both 
constant and non-constant total wealth, the expression for the sensitivity of the optimal 
bequest to family tradition is the same. 
 
 For a given total wealth, 
2
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and when total wealth is not given: 
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 There is a possible interesting link between the family tradition model and heritability 
of ability. Take two individuals with the same wealth: one, W, who inherited wealth, the other, 
Z, who did not. Then, W has less non-inherited wealth, which could likely reflect lower 
ability. Assuming heritability of ability, W’s child is likely to be of lower-ability than Z’s 
child. Then even though W and Z have the same wealth, W will leave a larger bequest to his 
child than Z, assuming that W and Z are equally altruistic toward their children. As we move 
intergenerationally, a “family tradition” type of pattern will be observed with individuals who 
inherit more bequeathing more, holding wealth constant; except, then, that in this scenario, the 
income of the child, kY , is not held the same, a dissimilarity effect that we do not have in 
derivations displayed above when we control for kY . 
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A HISTORICAL CASE STUDY  
If inheritance experience bears importantly on bequest behaviour, we should be able to find 
evidence of bequest behaviour that is in line with the inheritance experience, even when the 
law governing bequests changes. Indeed, if the maintenance of an inheritance tradition is all 
that important, we should expect the adjustment to a change in the law that governs bequests 
to come about largely through a change in variables other than bequest practices. 
 
 Consider an agriculture-based population in which primogeniture has been practised 
for generations - a population of dynasties. With a constant supply of N farms, there are N 
dynasties. The population is also characterized by a steady-state fertility pattern. 
 
 Under primogeniture, the children of a given family can be split into two groups: one 
group consists of the eldest son, e, who on the parent’s death will receive the family’s entire 
estate. The other group consists of all other children, j, none of whom will receive any of the 
estate. The fertility behaviour of the j children, who know that their own children will not 
inherit a farm either, can be expected to have factored in this eventuality. Child e, who in due 
course will inherit the family’s entire estate, must be aware of his dynastic role as a 
“custodian” - recipient, holder and “transferer” - of the family’s estate. The fertility behaviour 
of this child should also be expected to factor in the looming estate transfer. 
 
 Suppose now that new legislation is enacted, replacing the primogeniture rule with 
equal division of the estate among all children, and consider the fertility response of j and e. 
The children of j would not have inherited a farm under primogeniture and will not inherit a 
farm under equal sharing either (since j were not in possession of farms in the first place). The 
new law should not then be expected to impact on the fertility behaviour of j one way or the 
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other. Assuming that the law binds, e will, however, now face a daunting dilemma: either 
replicate the past inheritance protocol or let the farm split as many ways as the number of 
children (sons) that he will have. Where the replication effect is strong, an alteration in 
fertility behaviour can be expected: if e were to have only one son, then the new bequest law 
would not dent the dynasty’s intergenerational transfer practice at all; if e were to reduce his 
(if sons only) fertility, then the impact of the law would be mitigated. 
 
 The empirically testable prediction that emanates from this line of reasoning is that 
(considering a period during which farming was practised widely) provinces in which the 
ratio of N to the total farming population was higher would have recorded a sharper fall in 
fertility on the change of the bequest law from primogeniture to equal sharing. Variation in 
fertility decline across provinces can be attributed to the varying extent by which the new law 
was binding in the provinces. 
 
 Although we were unable to marshal evidence that directly corroborates this 
prediction, we were able to find evidence that closely bears on it. 
 
 A series of legislative steps that started in 1793 in the French National Assembly and 
was followed by Napoleon’s Civil Code of 1804 dramatically changed the “grid” that shaped 
French inheritance rules and practices in place ever since the Middle Ages: equal inheritance 
replaced strict impartibility. Students of the French family, especially Le Play5 and his 
followers in the middle of the nineteenth century, argued that “the adoption of the Civil Code 
in France, which strongly restricted testamentary freedom in favor of nearly equal inheritance 
prescribed by law, was a decisive factor in explaining why the French birth rate was low. The 
argument was that when the peasant proprietor was faced with the prospect of being forced to 
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divide his land among several children, he practiced family limitation … . As a result a 
relatively high birth rate was maintained only in those areas where division was resisted.” 
(Berkner and Mendels 1978).An empirical study drawing on the French censuses of 1856, 
1876, and 1901, and confined to départements (administrative units) that were predominantly 
rural and agricultural during the 1856-1901 period, finds that “because stem families feared 
the new inheritance laws or because of tradition which preceded the Revolutionary laws, stem 
families reduce[d] fertility” (Parish and Schwartz 1972), emphasis added. (Stem families are 
families in which one child marries and stays within the household while the others leave, and 
one child inherits the land.) 
 
 Evidence supportive of the argument of Le Play’s followers that “the role of the eldest 
son in a preferential inheritance system was being replaced by an only son in a system of 
equal partibility” (Berkner and Mendels 1978) seems to suggest that, as predicted by our 
approach, families sought to maintain inheritance traditions even in an environment that 
turned inhospitable to such a continuation. 
 
 Excluding the four most urban départements, thus confining attention to 82 rural 
départements in the first half of the nineteenth century, and assuming that the share of land-
owning families in a département is closely positively correlated with the land tax per person 
in a département, there is evidence that marital fertility declined first and more in the “richest” 
départements (where richness is measured by land tax and “landed income”), while the 
poorest départements maintained high levels of marital fertility. Whereas “the factors stressed 
by demographic transition theory, primarily urbanization and industrialization, show no clear 
relation to fertility in the French départements at the time” (van de Walle 1978), our approach 
suggests an explanation for the onset and variability of the decline in fertility. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A1: The more important questions from SHARE used in the empirical analysis 
Question Wave 
Is your natural mother/father still alive? 1 & 2 
How many children do you have that are still alive? Please count all natural children, 
fostered, adopted and stepchildren, including those of your husband/your wife/your partner. 1 & 2 
Now please think of the last twelve months. Not counting any shared housing or shared 
food, have you or your husband/wife/partner given (received) any financial or material gift 
or support to any person inside or outside this household amounting to 250 euro (in local 
currency) or more? 1 
Now please think of the time since the last interview. Not counting any shared housing or 
shared food, have you or your husband/wife/partner/partner given (received) any financial or 
material gift or support to any person inside or outside this household amounting to 250 euro 
(in local currency) or more? 2 
About how much did this person give you or your husband/wife/partner (give to this person) 
altogether in the last twelve months? 1 
About how much did this person give you or your husband/wife/partner (give to this person) 
altogether in the time since the last interview? 2 
Not counting any large gift we have already talked about, have you or your 
husband/wife/partner ever received a gift or inherited money, goods, or property worth more 
than 5000 euro (in local currency)? 1 & 2 
Think of the largest gift or inheritance you received. In which year did you or your 
husband/wife/partner receive it?  1 & 2 
From whom did you or your husband/wife/partner receive this gift or inheritance?  1 & 2 
How did you acquire this property? Did you... 1. Purchase or build it solely with own means 
2. Purchase or build it with help from family 3. Receive it as a bequest 4. Receive it as a gift 
5. Acquire it through other means.  1 & 2 
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Table A1: The more important questions from SHARE used in the empirical analysis (Cont’d) 
Thinking about the next ten years, what are the chances that you will receive any 
inheritance, including property and other valuables?  1 & 2 
Within the next ten years, what are the chances that you will receive an inheritance worth 
more than 50,000 euro (in local currency)?  1 & 2 
Including property and other valuables, what are the chances that you or your 
husband/wife/partner will leave an inheritance totaling 50000 (150000) euro (in local 
currency) or more? 1 & 2 
What are the chances that you or your husband/wife/partner will leave any inheritance?  1 & 2 
Please look at card 32. Looking at this card, which, if any, of these savings and investments 
do you or your husband/wife/partner have? 1. Bank accounts, transaction accounts or saving 
accounts 2. Government or corporate bonds 3. Stocks or shares (listed or unlisted on stock 
market) 4. Mutual funds or managed investment accounts 5. Individual retirements accounts 
6. Contractual saving for housing 7. Life insurance 96. None of these.  1 
Do you or your husband/wife/partner currently have any money in bank accounts, 
transaction accounts or saving accounts (government or corporate bonds) (…) [and so forth 
analogously to the above question]. 2 
About how much did you or your husband/wife/partner have in bank accounts, transaction 
accounts or saving accounts (…) [and so forth] at the end of 2003? 1 
About how much do you and your husband/wife/partner currently have in bank accounts, 
transaction accounts, saving accounts or postal accounts (…) [and so forth]? 2 
Source: SHARE questionnaires for waves 1 and 2.  
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Table A2: Country-specific characteristics of SHARE countries 
  
Percentage of heirs in 
SHARE 
Retirement age in 2004 
men (women) 
Effective inheritance tax rate 
  Panel Cross-section Statutory Early 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Austria 13.72 12.78 65 (65) - 4.51 4.51 4.51 4.51 
Belgium 12.26 12.77 65 (65) 60 (60) 8.00 8.00 21.90 21.90 
Czech Rep. 12.70 12.70 63 (59) 60 (56) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 7.04 6.81 65 (65) - 3.46 3.46 3.46 3.46 
France 14.25 13.02 60 (60) - 6.53 8.03 8.03 7.57 
Germany 12.29 11.70 65 (65) 63 (63) 4.47 4.47 4.47 4.47 
Greece 17.80 17.60 65 (65) 55 (55) 17.00 17.00 16.42 15.70 
Ireland 11.92 11.92 66 (66) 65 (65) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Israel - 5.75 - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Italy 17.78 17.24 65 (60) 60 (60) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 4.34 4.90 65 (65) 60 (60) 21.27 15.62 15.53 15.41 
Poland 10.46 10.46 65 (60) 60 (55) 6.99 6.99 6.99 0.00 
Spain 16.85 14.92 65 (65)  60 (60)  14.53 14.53 14.53 14.53 
Sweden 11.09 10.75 65 (61) 61 (61) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Switzerland 14.31 13.81 65 (64) 63 (62) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sources: SHARE waves 1 and 2, release 2-5-0, OECD, AGN International, Amihoud Borochov Law Office, 
Dziennik Ustaw, Global Property Guide. 
Note: For the panel research sample, the reported percentages are from wave 2. The effective tax rates are 
calculated for bequests consisting of a house (worth 600,000 Euros), cash (1,000,000 Euros), company quoted 
(300,000 Euros), and unquoted (700,000 Euros) shares left intestate to a wife and two children on January 1 for 
each considered year. For Poland, it is assumed that the apartment price is 2,000 Euros/sq. m., and that heirs do 
not own other apartments or houses. No tax is levied on the value of the apartment or house up to 110 sq. m. 
pursuant to Subsections 16.1-8 of Poland’s Act on the Taxation of Inheritances and Donations of July 28, 1983. 
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Table A3: Percentages of heirs who inherited a house and percentage of house owners who 
inherited a house by country in the panel and in the cross-section research samples 
Percentage of heirs 
who inherited a house 
Panel Cross-section 
Austria 66.24 76.46 
Belgium 39.86 45.39 
Czech Republic  81.64 
Denmark 18.23 15.55 
France 61.94 65.39 
Germany 69.04 76.34 
Greece 76.50 80.84 
Ireland  88.24 
Israel  53.15 
Italy 69.47 81.56 
Netherlands 17.55 18.00 
Poland  95.89 
Spain 58.38 69.07 
Sweden 27.73 30.81 
Switzerland 49.43 52.85 
All 66.94 72.99 
Number of individuals 2,091 3,554 
Source: SHARE waves 1 and 2, release 2-5-0. 
Note: For the panel research sample, the reported values are from wave 2. 
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Table A4: Results of the propensity score logistic regression 
Propensity score  Coeff. S.e.   
Female -0.080 (0.093)  
Only child 0.434 (0.142) *** 
Father’s lifespan 0.011 (0.004) *** 
Father’s last occupation:     ISCO sub-major 13 0.202 (0.252)  
ISCO sub-major 21 0.643 (0.327) ** 
ISCO sub-major 61 0.393 (0.132) *** 
ISCO sub-major 83 0.231 (0.199)  
ISCO sub-major 92 -0.216 (0.169)  
Mother’s last occupation:   ISCO sub-major 34 -0.516 (0.534)  
ISCO sub-major 61 -0.130 (0.338)  
ISCO sub-major 91 -0.693 (0.520)  
ISCO sub-major 92 0.267 (0.313)  
Homeworker -0.310 (0.223)  
Inactive -0.605 (1.003)  
Respondent’s education:             ISCED level 2 0.186 (0.143)  
ISCED level 3 0.267 (0.126) ** 
ISCED level 4 0.757 (0.248) *** 
ISCED level 5 0.714 (0.153) *** 
ISCED level 6 0.447 (0.807)  
Country:                                                 Austria -0.193 (0.995)  
Belgium -0.086 (0.416)  
Czech Republic 0.584 (0.146) *** 
Denmark -0.478 (0.212) ** 
France 0.072 (0.215) ** 
Germany -0.065 (0.217)  
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Table A4: Results of the propensity score logistic regression (Cont’d) 
Greece 0.202 (0.450)  
Italy 0.221 (0.190)  
Netherlands -1.293 (0.339) *** 
Spain 0.457 (0.236) * 
Sweden -0.194 (0.258)  
Switzerland 0.278 (0.377)  
Constant -3.313 (0.308) *** 
Wald test  149.52 *** 
Number of individuals   4,908   
Source: SHARE waves 1 and 2, release 2-5-0 supplemented by the unreleased data on parents’ last occupation.6 
Note: * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Coeff.: coefficient. S.e.: standard error. Ref. group: Men with ISCED 
education level lower than 2 living in Poland whose parents did not work in any of the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) sub-majors: 13 - general managers; 21 - physical, mathematical, and 
engineering science professionals (fathers only); 34 - other associate professionals (mothers); 61 - market-
oriented skilled agricultural and fishery workers; 83 - drivers and mobile-plant operators (fathers); 91 - sales and 
services elementary occupations (mothers); or 92 - agricultural, fishery, and related laborers. 
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Table A5: Percentages of heirs and non-heirs who reported 100 chances of bequeathing by 
wealth decile groups in the cross-section research sample 
Proportion of 
individuals declaring:  
Chances to 
bequeath 
anything  
equal to 100 
Chances to 
bequeath 50,000 
Euros or more equal 
to 100 
Chances to bequeath 
150,000 Euros or more 
equal to 100 
 
Net wealth decile 
group 
Heirs Non-heirs Heirs Non-heirs Heirs Non-heirs 
1 52.98 20.12 19.23 21.31 15.48 15.31 
2 63.71 46.41 27.02 32.29 10.12 16.28 
3 53.04 30.16 53.14 38.62 15.91 12.23 
4 15.50 27.90 42.24 44.76 9.62 8.61 
5 44.47 36.60 51.80 50.08 24.31 18.05 
6 8.19 34.76 55.09 45.12 46.08 35.05 
7 36.77 32.65 54.16 49.39 40.36 44.21 
8 43.21 39.24 66.12 53.82 61.32 57.91 
9 57.52 45.07 63.60 56.57 66.58 60.49 
10 48.14 32.28 62.06 56.37 62.79 58.45 
Number of 
individuals 
198 1,227 1,129 5,682 930 4,467 
Source: SHARE waves 1 and 2, release 2-5-0. 
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Table A6: Results obtained in the linear estimations of the intention to bequeath with five 
multiple imputations of household net wealth by region 
Intention to bequeath Panel (RE) Cross-section DD (FE) PSM 
  Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. 
        South         
Experience of inheriting .347*** (.070) .309*** (.057) 1.33 (1.85) .249*** (.061) 
Expectation of inheriting .525*** (.065) .475*** (.049) .594*** (.084) .449*** (.054) 
Trans. expected net wealth .220*** (.009) .218*** (.013) .232*** (.012) .233*** (.014) 
Log number of children -.369*** (.055) -.394*** (.057) -.456*** (.069) -.257*** (.064) 
Inheritance tax .008** (.003) .009*** (.003) .005 (.004) .011*** (.003) 
Married .148 (.142) .113 (.121) .118 (.180) .266* (.139) 
Widowed -.091 (.152) -.098 (.133) -.094 (.192) .062 (.153) 
Working .265*** (.068) .268*** (.067) .229*** (.087) .279*** (.074) 
Retired .214** (.084) .257*** (.073) .224** (.111) .227*** (.079) 
Wald/LR test 49.8***  36.7***  34.1***  30.5***  
Number of observations 4,952  5,642  3,272  4,206   
    Central     
Experience of inheriting .371*** (.064) .305*** (.049) .373 (.784) .338*** (.052) 
Expectation of inheriting .542*** (.057) .505*** (.040) .484*** (.083) .495*** (.044) 
Trans. expected net wealth .207*** (.006) .206*** (.007) .238*** (.011) .206*** (.008) 
Log number of children -.242*** (.047) -.226*** (.044) -.242*** (.069) -.247*** (.048) 
Inheritance tax .062*** (.006) .058*** (.005) .026** (.013) .065*** (.006) 
Married .250*** (.069) .233*** (.063) .376*** (.103) .173** (.068) 
Widowed .069 (.080) .096 (.075) .195 (.118) .048 (.082) 
Working .187*** (.063) .152** (.060) .256*** (.091) .116* (.067) 
Retired .272*** (.072) .252*** (.063) .237** (.108) .181** (.071) 
Wald/LR test 100.6***  85.7***  41.8***  74.8***  
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Table A6: Results obtained in the linear estimations of the intention to bequeath with five 
multiple imputations of household net wealth by region (Cont’d) 
Number of observations 7,335   8,816  3,085  7,154   
       North         
Experience of inheriting .373*** (.104) .311*** (.059) -.388 (1.783) .243*** (.064) 
Expectation of inheriting .488*** (.066) .360*** (.045) .512*** (.086) .392*** (.050) 
Trans. expected net wealth .157*** (.008) .145*** (.012) .151*** (.009) .137*** (.013) 
Log number of children -.112* (.063) -.101* (.053) -.076 (.080) -.096 (.059) 
Inheritance tax -.022*** (.003) -.019*** (.003) -.028*** (.004) -.020*** (.004) 
Married .486*** (.084) .400*** (.074) .522*** (.109) .407*** (.081) 
Widowed .325*** (.109) .286*** (.096) .265* (.137) .334*** (.106) 
Working .322*** (.091) .293*** (.085) .157 (.116) .321*** (.096) 
Retired .351*** (.090) .348*** (.078) .271** (.118) .338*** (.088) 
Wald/LR test 56.9***  47.1***  38.0***  34.4***  
Number of observations 4,035   5,615   2,656   4,388   
Source: SHARE waves 1 and 2, release 2-5-0.  
Note: * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Trans: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (θ=1). Coeff.: 
coefficient. S.e.: standard error. Ref. group: The inactive or unemployed single men with at most ISCED level 1 
of the least educated child, not receiving nor providing financial transfers to children. Estimations with constant 
term control for the receipt of financial transfers from children, the provision of financial transfers to children, 6 
ISCED education levels of the least educated child, and having a daughter in all estimations. South (Greece, 
Italy, Spain, and Israel), Central (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Poland, Switzerland), 
and North (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden). Fuller results available upon request. PSM: 7 random draws. 
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NOTES 
1. Drawing on a two-wave panel for the US, Hurd and Smith (2001) obtained results that are 
in line with our conjecture: subjective probabilities to bequeath are accurate predictors of the 
probabilities of actual bequests. Data covering the complete life span of a cohort could be 
used to shed additional light on whether intended bequests gestate into actual bequests. In 
spite of being a longitudinal study, SHARE falls short in this regard: the subsample of 
deceased respondents whose actual bequests are known is small and not representative and, 
thus, is unsuitable for studying a link between actual bequests and intended bequests. To the 
best of our knowledge, other sources of comparable data for a broad set of European countries 
are not available. 
2. For the exact wording of the questions that yielded the data used in the empirical analysis 
see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
3. The alternatives are as follows: 1 - the intention to bequeath is equal to the chances to 
bequeath at least 50,000 Euros; 2 - inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the 
operationalization 1; 3 - the intention to bequeath equals 1 if the chances to bequeath at least 
50,000 Euros are positive or chances to bequeath anything equal 100, 0 otherwise; 4 - the 
intention to bequeath equals 0, 1, 2 if the chances to bequeath anything are respectively 0, 
from 0 to 100, 100; 3 if the chances to bequeath at least 50,000 Euros are from 0 to 100 and 
the chances to bequeath at least 150,000 Euros are 0; 4, 5, 6 if the chances to bequeath at least 
50,000 Euros are 100 and the chances to bequeath at least 150,000 Euros are respectively 0, 
from 0 to 100, and 100. 
4. Estimation results by region are in Table A6 in the Appendix. 
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5. The pioneering sociologist Le Play is described as someone “who was able to assess events 
more accurately than many of his contemporaries” and who, to the insights of contemporary 
thinkers, added “fieldwork with careful, empirically sound observations” (Parish and 
Schwartz, 1972). 
6. The permission granted to us by SHARE team to use unreleased SHARE data on parents’ 
occupation is gratefully acknowledged. 
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